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Abstract We develop a model to describe the development of dominance relations between
social animals as they use past experiences to inform future interactions. Using the game-
theoretic framework of a Hawk-Dove game with asymmetric resource-holding potentials
(RHPs), we derive a simple model that describes the social interactions of animals that
compete for resources. We then consider a game-playing strategy in which animals acquire
information about their RHP asymmetry from the results of their previous contests and sub-
sequently use their asymmetry assessment to inform their behavior in future contests. We ex-
amine how directly incorporating the fact that animals have incomplete information in their
interactions can lead to outcomes that differ from what would be expected if one considers
the situation as a static game in which the animals have perfect information about the asym-
metry size. We thereby obtain results that are consistent with observations of dominance-
hierarchy formation in social animals. We also discuss how increased interactions between
animals can speed up the asymmetry assessment process and how this can explain why ag-
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gression can sometimes decrease as the number of interactions between animals increases
over time.
Keywords evolutionary game theory · animal behavior · dominance relations
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
From tiny insects to large mammals, nature includes many examples of animals that live
together in groups. Such social animals gain several benefits from living in a group, includ-
ing the dilution of predation risk and increased foraging success [6]. However, the limited
availability of resources (such as water, food, and space) forces social animals to divide re-
stricted resources amongst themselves. This can involve peaceful exchanges, violent fights,
or other forms of social interaction; and different groups of social animals have developed
different strategies for determining what type of behavior to exhibit when interacting with
other animals in their group. This variety in the strategies observed in social animals makes
the study of social behavior a rich area for research. It also yields several problems that are
amenable to mathematical investigation.
In the evolution of social behavior, a key factor is whether participants meet just once
or whether they meet repeatedly [56]. In the famous example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it
is always best for a pair of participants to defect or behave selfishly in a one-off interaction.
However, the Prisoner’s Dilemma can yield cooperation in the case of repeated interactions
[3, 32, 42, 43]: participants can achieve a better outcome if they cooperate, even to the point
of giving or sharing valuable resources. The so-called ‘shadow of the future’ (i.e., the future
consequences of failing to reciprocate) can imply that giving up or sharing a resource on
one occasion is beneficial in the long run because of the many future occasions in which a
cooperator receives resources in return [3]. Such a notion of delayed reciprocity, which arises
amidst repeated interactions among a group of individuals, is sometimes called ‘reciprocal
altruism.’
The evolution of reciprocal altruism has received a great deal of theoretical attention
[16, 32, 42], despite the relative paucity of empirical evidence for it [12, 18]. Meanwhile,
there have been comparatively few studies of the evolution of the much more established
and rather widespread phenomenon of dominance hierarchies among social animals.
Dominance hierarchies, which also arise from repeated interactions among the same
individuals, occur in many groups animals — including birds, fish, mammals, and insects
[5, 10, 50] — and they are interesting theoretically because animals appear to behave altru-
istically once such a hierarchy has been established. Subordinates give way to dominants
and allow them to take resources without a fight, often without any show of aggression
(or even by avoiding any interactions altogether). This raises several key questions: Why
should dominance hierarchies arise? Why should subordinate animals stop even attempting
to obtain valuable resources? In this paper, we show that dominance hierarchies can arise
naturally from a series of animal contests in the form of a series of asymmetric Hawk-Dove
games that covers situations in which the same participants meet repeatedly.
The original Hawk-Dove game [36] assumes that animals that are in conflict over a
resource play either a ‘Hawk’ strategy (i.e., always fight and continue until injured or the
opponent retreats) or a ‘Dove’ strategy (i.e., display but retreat if the opponent escalates). In
any particular conflict, it is assumed that an animal picks its strategy uniformly at random
Dominance Relationships Via Strategy Updating in an Asymmetric Hawk-Dove Game 3
and also irrespective of previous interactions or any asymmetries such as size differences.
A simple modification of the original Hawk-Dove game introduces a third strategy, ‘Condi-
tional Hawk’, which takes asymmetries into account: a Conditional Hawk plays the Hawk
strategy if an opponent is smaller but plays the Dove strategy if the opponent is larger. It has
been demonstrated that the strategy of ‘Conditional Hawk with assessment’ is superior to
both Hawk and Dove [35, 37]. This result has to led to considerable interest in how animals
might assess and use information about asymmetries — especially asymmetries in fighting
ability or ‘resource-holding potential’ (RHP) — to switch adaptively between Hawk and
Dove strategies [2, 26, 37, 45, 46]. Body size alone can give some indication of RHP, but it
can also be cheated (e.g., via raised hair or feathers) and it is not necessarily a reliable in-
dicator of fighting ability, because RHP also varies with health, nutritional status, and other
factors that can experience short-term changes. Animals might therefore use the results of
actual fighting to discern whether they are stronger than others [7, 19, 33, 39] and to adjust
their behavior as their strength changes with age and experience [21].
An important development was the realization that assessment signals — particularly
those that are costly to produce — can be more reliable indicators of RHP than body size
alone [45, 46]. For example, red deer stags signal their RHPs by engaging in roaring matches
[13]. A challenger stag begins by roaring at a low rate, the other stag responds by roaring
at a higher rate, and so on. Roaring matches tend to occur between stags who are closely
matched in body size, and they tend to be exhausting for both stags. Roaring uses the same
thoracic muscles as fighting, so an ability to roar at a high rate (and to maintain the peak rate
for a long duration) is highly correlated with fighting ability. The roaring match escalates
until one stag retreats or the two stags — unable to decide relative fighting ability based on
roaring rate — proceed to the next phase of their assessment process (the ‘parallel walk’) or
to an actual fight.
Assessment signals also carry a disadvantage: although they give information about
fighting ability without the dangers of actually engaging in a fight, this information is gained
at a considerable cost [17, 46]. For example, a stag cannot provoke the maximum roaring
rate that its opponent is capable of achieving unless it roars at a comparable rate. This is ex-
hausting for both the stag and its opponent [47]. However, given that a stag’s body condition
and fighting ability can change considerably over the course of a breeding season, it might
still be beneficial for a challenger stag to repeatedly pay the costs of assessment. An older
stag might be able to defeat a younger one at the beginning of a breeding season but have
a much lower ability to do so after several weeks of defending a group of females without
much chance to eat [13].
When the fighting ability of animals is stable over time, repeated interactions between
the same animals can take a completely different form. Instead of paying the often consider-
able costs of assessment signals for each encounter, animals can use the outcome of previous
fights with a given opponent to avoid not only the costs of a fight that it is likely to lose but
also the costs of giving assessment signals. In this situation, one expects dominance hierar-
chies to form, and our aim in this paper is to show how repeated interactions between the
same individuals in an asymmetric game can lead to the formation of stable dominance re-
lations (which in turn yield dominance hierarchies). In our model, animals gain information
about their own and an opponent’s RHP through fighting in a series of encounters (rather
than through assessment signals before or during a single encounter). This formulation al-
lows our model to incorporate one of the most striking features of dominance hierarchies
in real animals: overt and damaging fighting as dominance relations in the hierarchy are
being formed, which contrasts starkly with the stable and peaceful stage that arises after a
hierarchy has been established [9, 11, 24, 44, 50].
4 J. K. Grewal, C. L. Hall, M. A. Porter, M. S. Dawkins
For a long-term strategy of repeatedly playing the Dove strategy without continuous
assessment to be successful, which is what one observes among subordinate animals in an
established dominance hierarchy, the animals need to have already gained very accurate and
reliable information about their own RHP and the RHPs of other animals. The stakes of an
encounter between a pair of animals include not merely one resource but all of the resources
that might be lost if an animal persistently assumes a subordinate position in the hierarchy
that is inappropriate for its true RHP. The value of accurate information about an animal’s
own and an opponent’s RHP is thus so large that it justifies a high cost to obtain it [17, 47],
even to the point of engaging in a real fight rather than using the less reliable information that
can be gained from assessment signals [44]. With this in mind, we have developed a model
in which animals gain high-quality information at the cost of having a small number of
fights initially, but then receive the benefits of long periods without fighting. This is typical
of many of the dominance hierarchies that have been observed in nature [9].
1.2 Outline
The primary aim of the present paper is to construct a model that allows us to explore the
acquisition of information from repeated contests and thereby to examine the development
of dominance relationships between individual animals from the same group. Our model
provides insight into the temporary but high levels of aggression that are observed in many
animal groups when they first form.
We use game theory to study this problem. This provides a convenient framework in
which to analyze the different behaviors that animals can exhibit. (See Ref. [53] for a com-
parative discussion of several possible approaches.) In the next section, we use the language
of game theory to formulate the problem of competition for resources among asymmetric
individuals. We begin our analysis with a static description of an asymmetric Hawk-Dove
game using the concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), and we use this as motiva-
tion to develop a new but tractable dynamic model in Section 3. We discuss our results in
Section 4, and we conclude and suggest possible extensions to our work in Section 5.
2 Setting up the Game-Theoretic Problem
In this paper, we work within the field of evolutionary game theory, which is concerned
with strategic interactions between members of evolving populations of organisms (such
as animals or plants). Evolutionary game theory is motivated by the expectation that more
successful strategies prevail over time relative to strategies that give lower payoffs. Although
evolutionary game theory has now been studied for several decades, even the classical theory
is still yielding fascinating new insights [1, 28].
2.1 Maynard Smith’s Hawk-Dove game
As described in Section 1.1, Maynard Smith created the ‘Hawk-Dove’ game to model animal
conflicts [36], in which two animals are contesting some resource and can behave in one of
two ways: either like a ‘Dove’ or like a ‘Hawk’ [35]. If both animals behave like Doves,
then they each gain an equal share of the resource. If one animal behaves like a Dove but
the other behaves like a Hawk, then the animal that plays the Hawk strategy wins the entire
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resource. A pair of interacting animals is said to be in a ‘dominance relation’ when one
animal persistently behaves like a Hawk and the other persistently behaves like a Dove.
In other words, a dominance relation exists between two individuals when one individual
attacks or threatens to attack the other, and the other individual shows little or no aggression
[11]. Finally, when both animals play the Hawk strategy, there will be a fight. In his original
model, Maynard Smith assumed in this situation that each animal has a 50% chance of injury
and a 50% chance of winning the fight (by injuring its opponent) [35].
We use the Hawk-Dove model as a foundation for our work. The key difference in the
problem that we study is that we do not assume that each animal has an equal probability of
winning a fight, because we want to account for the natural asymmetries in animal groups.
This results in an asymmetric game.
2.1.1 The Evolutionary Stable Strategy
When he developed the Hawk-Dove game, Maynard Smith also introduced the biologically-
motivated concept of an ‘evolutionary stable strategy’ (ESS) with which to analyze the game
[35]. The definition of an ESS is based on the following idea: if all members of a population
adopt the ESS, then a mutant strategy cannot successfully invade the population.
Because the problem that we study involves an asymmetric game, we need to consider
a modified definition for an ESS that describes a strategy for each player. We use similar
notation to that in Ref. [35]. We consider a contest between two animals, which we label A
and B, and we define pii(X ,Y ) to be the payoff to animal i ∈ {A,B} when animal A plays
strategy X and animal B plays strategy Y .
Definition: A strategy pair (I∗,J∗) is called an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if
piA(I∗,J)> piA(I,J) for all I 6= I∗
and
piB(I,J∗)> piB(I,J) for all J 6= J∗.
Note that the existence of an ESS does not guarantee that a population will achieve
that ESS. The definition of an ESS requires the majority of a population to be playing that
strategy, and such a strategy might be ‘inaccessible’ [41]. Nevertheless, the concept of an
ESS is useful, as it can provide insight into the possible evolutionary states that a population
can obtain.
2.2 Modelling the Problem
In this paper, we aim to show how repeated interactions between the same individuals in an
asymmetric game can lead to the formation of stable dominance relations. We thus make
the assumption that the probability of repeated interactions between group members is high,
so that the benefits of being in a hierarchy can be sufficient to warrant the costs that are
associated with establishing a set of dominance relations that yield a dominance hierarchy
[16].
We also follow four of the assumptions1 that Maynard Smith made in Ref. [35]: (i) the
animals are contesting a resource whose amount is limited; (ii) the resource is divisible;
1 These assumptions are in addition to any assumptions that automatically arise from formulating the
problem that we study as a game.
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(iii) all contests between animals are pairwise; and (iv) all reproduction is asexual (in the
sense that offspring are identical to their parents in strategy choice and RHP). The assump-
tion about reproduction is necessary in order to make the concept of an ESS meaningful:
although our work concentrates entirely on the ‘short’ timescale on which a social struc-
ture forms within a group of animals — as opposed to the ‘long’ timescale on which social
strategies might evolve across generations — we implicitly assume that there is some evo-
lutionary pressure that pushes animals to pick a social strategy that maximizes the resources
that they can collect (and hence drives the population towards an ESS.)
In Ref. [37], Maynard Smith and Parker discussed conditional strategies, which involve
using visual cues or costly signals to assess asymmetry size before a contest. They also
discussed the gaining of information during a contest. However, the formulation in Ref. [37]
assumes that an individual uses only the result of the current round to decide whether to
continue a contest for a subsequent round. In the present paper, by contrast, we assume that
prior information acquired through all previous rounds is used to update strategy choices.
We also assume that asymmetries are assessed through actual fighting rather than through
costly signals. Additionally, we introduce additional components into the fighting costs to
reflect the realistic feature that losers and winners both experience injury, but to different
extents.
Importantly, we make the simplifying assumption that the ‘resource-holding potentials’
(RHPs) of the animals in a group do not vary significantly over time. (An RHP measures
an animal’s capacity to defeat an opponent who is playing the same strategy.) We make this
assumption because we need RHPs to remain constant over a sufficiently long period to
ensure that the constant revision of estimates of relative RHP through repeated fighting is
not beneficial. We assume that the total amount of the resource is fixed, and we normalize
its total amount to be 1.
We want to model how animals interact with each other. As in the classical Hawk-Dove
game, we suppose that each animal can play one of two strategies: Hawk or Dove. Although
it is more realistic to also consider additional strategies, it is both convenient and reasonable
to consider only these two possibilities, because they reflect the main types of behavior that
animals exhibit [8, 14, 54].
As we discussed in Section 2.1, three possible results arise from considering a situation
in which animals A and B can play the strategies Dove or Hawk: both animals can share the
resource, one can withdraw from the contest after the series of displays (so that the resource
goes to its opponent), or both animals can escalate the situation into a fight.
In the final scenario, a fight occurs, and we assume (as in Ref. [35]) that each animal will
continue fighting until either it is injured and or it is forced to retreat. Thus, two outcomes
are possible: either A wins the fight or B wins the fight. Furthermore, fighting includes
associated costs that we need to take into acount. In Ref. [35], Maynard Smith assumed
that fighting results in one of the two animals becoming injured and thus forced to retreat.
However, it is more realistic to suppose when two animals fight that both the winner and the
loser can incur some injury (although to different extents). We let cL ≥ 0 denote the cost of
fighting for the loser, and let cW ≥ 0 denote the cost of fighting for the winner. We suppose
that injuries from a fight include a base cost of being in a fight, which we denote by c0L for
the loser and c0W for the winner, as well as an additional cost that depends on the asymmetry
in the RHPs of the two animals (i.e., an animal with a lower RHP suffers a higher cost in a
fight). We assume for simplicity that the asymmetry in cost has a linear dependence on the
difference in RHP, and we use c1L to denote the additional injury cost for the loser and c1W
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to denote the additional injury cost for the winner. In summary, the costs of fighting are
cL = c0L + c1L y ,
cW = c0W − c1W y ,
c0L , c1L , c0W , c1W ≥ 0 ,
where the asymmetry in RHP is defined by
y = RHP of winner−RHP of loser . (2.1)
We now consider the probability for an animal to win a fight. Once such a probability
is determined, it can be used to compute the expected payoff when an animal fights. We
can then summarize the game using a payoff matrix, which in turn allows us to determine
the game’s ESS. In Ref. [35], Maynard Smith assumed that the two animals have an equal
probability of winning a fight. However, we are considering animals with different RHPs, so
we also need to incorporate asymmetry into the probability of winning a fight. Suppose that
the RHP s of an animal is normalized so that s ∈ [0,1]. We define the difference z ∈ [−1,1]
in the RHPs to be
z = RHP of animal A−RHP of animal B . (2.2)
Using this formulation of asymmetry gives the game shown in Fig. 1. Note that the Hawk-
Hawk box (in the lower right) includes two possible payoffs for each animal. The entries at
the top of the box apply when animal B wins the fight, and the entries at the bottom apply
when animal A wins the fight.
Animal A
Animal B
Dove Hawk
Dove
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
(0,1)
Hawk (1,0)
(−c0L + c1Lz,1− c0W − c1W z)
or
(1− c0W + c1W z,−c0L− c1Lz)
Fig. 1: A payoff matrix for incorporating resource-holding potential (RHP) asymmetry into
a Hawk-Dove game. The Hawk-Hawk box incorporates the idea that both the winner and
the loser in a fight between two animals incur injury (which can be to different extents).
We assume that the probability pAwins that animal A wins the fight is of the form
pAwins =
1
2
z+
1
2
. (2.3)
This choice is analytically tractable, and it is a reasonable simplification because it captures
the fact that the probability that animal A wins a fight increases as z increases. This cor-
responds to an increase in the RHP of animal A relative to that of animal B. Additionally,
the two animals have an equal probability of winning the fight when they have the same
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RHP (i.e., when z= 0). Because pAwins = 1− pBwins , it follows that the probability pBwins that
animal B wins the fight is
pBwins =
1
2
− 1
2
z . (2.4)
Using the probability of winning a fight and the costs of fighting (which take an ana-
lytically tractable form), we calculate the expected payoff for each animal when there is an
escalated contest. Let δA and δB denote the respective expected payoffs for animal A and
animal B to fight each other. We assume that these payoffs have the form
δA = αz2+β z+ γ ,
δB = αz2−β z+ γ , (2.5)
where
α =
1
2
(
c1W − c1L) ,
β =
1
2
(
1− c0W + c1W + c0L + c1L) ,
γ =
1
2
(1− c0W − c0L) . (2.6)
This yields the game in Fig. 2.
Animal A
Animal B
Dove Hawk
Dove
( 1
2 ,
1
2
)
(0,1)
Hawk (1,0) (δA,δB)
Fig. 2: The payoff matrix for the expected game between animals A and B, where each
animal can adopt either a Hawk strategy or a Dove strategy. The parameters δA and δB
denote, respectively, the expected payoffs from fighting for animals A and B.
2.2.1 Analyzing the Game
One way to study evolutionary games is to conduct a static analysis, which entails determin-
ing the parameter values for which a game has one or more ESSs. In this section, we use
such a simple analysis to gain some understanding of the game and to motivate further de-
velopment of our model. Conveniently, we need not consider the existence of ‘mixed’ ESSs
— where individuals pick their strategy for a particular interaction according to some prob-
abilistic rule — as it has been proven that asymmetric games do not possess mixed ESSs
[51].
We use the notation of X-Y to indicate that animal A plays strategy X and animal B
plays strategy Y . By considering the definition of an ESS, one can see that the strategy pairs
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Dove-Hawk and Hawk-Dove satisfy the ESS conditions for certain values of the parameters
that appear in the Hawk-Hawk box in Fig. 2. More precisely, these ESSs exist whenever
the parameter choices give a positive expected payoff from fighting for one animal and a
negative expected payoff from fighting for the other. Whichever animal expects to achieve a
negative payoff when there is a fight is the animal that plays Dove in the ESS strategy pair.
These two ESSs provide some insight into how a dominance hierarchy can be formed
in a group of animals. As we discussed earlier, a dominance relation exists between two
individuals when one attacks or threatens to attack the other but the other shows little or
no aggression. Using the notion of a dominance relation, we interpret the Dove-Hawk ESS
as indicating that animal A is dominated by animal B, whereas the Hawk-Dove ESS corre-
sponds to animal A dominating animal B. Combining all of the dominance relations between
members in an animal group yields a dominance hierarchy. See the discussion in Section 4.1.
When fighting (i.e., the Hawk-Hawk strategy pair) gives a negative expected payoff
for each animal, then the Dove-Hawk and Hawk-Dove strategy pairs are both ESSs. This
raises an interesting problem of determining which strategy an animal would use in such a
situation. We discuss this issue in further detail in Section 2.3.
2.3 Motivation for Our Model
We seek to examine how the strategies develop over time and how this can lead to a dom-
inance relation. We consider pairwise contests between animals and then use the outcomes
of these pairwise interactions to construct a model for the changing behavior of a population
of animals over time.
In our model, animals do not initially know the true size of the asymmetries between
themselves and their opponents. We incorporate such uncertainty directly into our model
and examine a situation in which each animal estimates the value of its asymmetry with an
opponent and then uses the information from this estimate to help determine its behavior.
Such estimation is known to occur in nature (see, for example, Ref. [13]). Moreover, it
clearly makes sense from a modelling perspective to incorporate uncertainty: if animals are
certain of differences in RHPs, then the animal with the largest RHP is seemingly very
unlikely to share a resource. However, resource-sharing between members of animal groups
has been demonstrated in many different types of species (from honeybees [55] to vervet
monkeys [52]). For example, vampire bats have been observed to regurgitate blood that they
have obtained in order to give it to a hungry member of their colony [59].
As we discussed above, which ESS occurs depends on the sign of the expected payoffs
from fighting. This provides an important motivation to consider how the strategies adopted
by animals evolve when faced with negative expected payoffs. In the context of animal
behavior, negative payoffs might correspond to situations in which the costs of fighting are
high. For example, combat can be lethal when animals are fighting over a resource that has
a significant value [30].
When the expected payoffs from fighting are negative for both players, we need to de-
termine the optimal strategy for the animals to choose. One possibility would be for both
players to follow the Dove strategy in order to avoid the possibility of injury associated with
a fight. However, this suggests an important question: What stops one animal from defect-
ing from the Dove strategy to obtain the entire resource by playing Hawk? Dove-Dove can
never be an ESS, and (as discussed in Section 2.2.1) both Hawk-Dove and Dove-Hawk are
possible ESSs when the expected payoff from fighting is negative for both players.
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This problem is reminiscent of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, in which two
players are each given the choice to either cooperate or defect [3]. In a single round of
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, each player chooses rationally whether to defect, despite
the fact that both players gain more when they both cooperate. However, cooperation can
occur in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which the same pair of players play the single-
round game repeatedly, because players can use information obtained from previous rounds
to help them decide which strategy to play. Because each player knows the strategies that
his/her opponent has played previously, a choice to defect is now more harmful than it is
in a single-round game because it encourages his/her opponent to defect in future rounds.
Consequently, both players are more likely to cooperate, and they each earn a significantly
better payoff than would have been the case by using any other strategy over the N > 1
rounds of the game. The game can be assumed to have an infinite horizon. (See Ref. [40] for
a discussion of termination rules and their effects on cooperation.)
As we have just discussed, cooperation can exist as an optimal strategy in the iter-
ated Prisoner’s Dilemma game even though defection is always optimal in a single-round
Prisoner’s Dilemma. A notable example of this is the ‘Tit for Tat’ strategy [3], which (in-
famously) was the winning strategy in a computer tournament of the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma. An individual that plays Tit for Tat cooperates in round 1 of a game; in round
n > 1, the player simply copies the strategy that its opponent played in round n− 1. This
example highlights how considering repeated interactions, which is the case for the ani-
mals in our example, can lead to different strategy choices than in single-round games. It is
worth noting, however, that an important limitation of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is its
dependence on the assumption of symmetric players [16].
3 The Model
Recall that we are considering contests between two animals A and B, and that we are allow-
ing the strategies that they employ to change from round to round. Specifically, we assume
that each animal has a probability of adopting the Hawk strategy and a complementary
probability of adopting the Dove strategy, and we let these probabilities evolve over time.
Let p(n)i denote the probability that animal i plays Hawk in the n
th round. We seek to de-
termine a relationship between p(n+1)i and p
(n)
i that, in some sense, optimizes the resources
that are gained by each animal over multiple encounters.
With this in mind, we need to construct an updating rule for the probability that each
animal uses the Hawk strategy. We hypothesize that an animal’s perception of optimal be-
havior (assuming perfect information about RHPs) is determined by whether its expected
payoff from fighting is positive or negative. From the static analysis, we have already seen
that Hawk-Hawk is a unique ESS when the expected payoff from fighting is positive for
both individuals. Similarly, if animal A has a positive (respectively, negative) expected pay-
off from fighting and animal B has a negative (respectively, positive) expected payoff from
fighting, then the only ESS is Hawk-Dove (respectively, Dove-Hawk).
However, we encounter some difficulty when both animals expect to receive a nega-
tive payoff from fighting. From the perspective of classical evolutionary game theory, both
Hawk-Dove and Dove-Hawk are ESSs in this situation, and it has been theorized that an-
imals use signals that do not change the RHP to determine who takes the Hawk role and
who takes the Dove role [46]. That notwithstanding, there are strong similarities between
repeated encounters in which both animals receive an expected negative payoff from fight-
ing and the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. It is easy to envisage a situation in which a large
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penalty for fighting leads animals to cooperate because pursuing an aggressive strategy risks
retaliation in later rounds. Consequently, with each animal possibly being penalized with
negative payoffs in the future, we posit that each of them would prefer to play Dove than
risk playing Hawk. One can also motivate such behavior as part of an act of mutual restraint
that reduces the animals’ energy costs and injury risks [22]. We therefore assume that the
preferred behavior of an individual animal depends only on the positivity of its own expected
payoff from fighting (regardless of the expected payoff for its competitor).
We use increments to change an animal’s strategy by a step towards its perceived optimal
strategy at each stage. Recall that δi denotes animal i’s expected payoff for fighting. We
compute the probability that animal i plays Hawk by using
p(n+1)i = p
(n)
i + k×
{
0− p(n)i , if δi < 0 ,
1− p(n)i , if δi ≥ 0 ,
(3.1)
where i ∈ {A,B} and the ‘responsiveness level’ of the animals is k ≥ 0. An animal’s re-
sponsiveness level measures how quickly it responds to events of previous rounds, and we
assume for simplicity that this value is the same for both animals. If k is too large, then there
is a chance for an ‘unlucky’ animal with high RHP to find itself as the subordinate after
losing a small number of fights by chance. If k is too small, however, then an animal with
low RHP might find itself severely injured because it persists in playing Hawk even when it
is clear that the expected payoff from fighting is negative. We see from equation (3.1) that
situations in which the expected payoff for fighting is positive will increase the probability
of choosing to fight during the next round, whereas situations in which the expected payoff
for fighting is negative will decrease this probability.
We now incorporate the idea that an animal does not initially know the size of the asym-
metry between itself and its opponent but has to find out by having fights. Because of the
high levels of aggression that occur initially when animals are placed into a group (see Sec-
tion 1), we suppose that each animal starts by playing Hawk with probability 1. Based on
repeated pairwise contests in the game, animals then update their perceptions of the real size
of the asymmetry. As we have discussed previously, the asymmetry size has a significant ef-
fect on the probability for an animal to win a fight. It thus has a significant effect on the
expected payoffs from fighting and, in turn, on the strategy to be played.
By updating the perceptions of RHP difference of the animals in the game, we model
how the behaviors of the animals evolve during the game. Because the estimated asymmetry
size between a pair of animals plays a significant role in the modelling of strategy choices,
it is important to use a good updating rule for the estimates of the asymmetry. As we discuss
in Section 3.1, we use Bayesian updating.
3.1 Bayesian Updating
Recall that z is the difference in RHPs:
z = RHP of animal A−RHP of animal B . (3.2)
We are considering a situation in which animals A and B each estimate z and then update
their estimates after each round of the game. To update these estimates from the outcomes
of the game, we use Bayesian updating, so beliefs about the true value of the asymmetry
z can be expressed as a probability and are updated as new information becomes available
[23].
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Bayesian updating involves iterated use of Bayes’ rule: we update prior estimates z
to obtain a posterior estimate of z that incorporates new information from a fight. In our
problem, we update the estimates of the asymmetry by calculating
P(z|fight outcome) = P(fight outcome|z) × P(z)
P(fight outcome)
, (3.3)
which gives a probability distribution for z. By determining the peak of the posterior, we
determine the most likely value of z and use this as the updated estimate of z. There is strong
evidence that animals are capable of updating, and there is also some evidence for Bayesian
updating in particular [57].
3.2 Simulation Examples
In our simulations, we take the prior probability distributions to be Gaussians that are cen-
tered at the initial estimates of the actual asymmetry size z and have a standard deviation
0.1. We run simulations of the model for N = 200 interactions between a pair of animals.
The game thus has N = 200 rounds.
In Fig. 3, we show the results of simulations for an actual asymmetry of z = 0.3 and
a responsiveness level of k = 0.1. In the top panels of Fig. 3, we show the results that we
obtain by using the parameters values c0W = 0.2, c0L = 0.5, c1W = 0.3, and c1L = 0.4. In
the bottom panels, we show the results that we obtain with the parameters values c0W = 0.4,
c0L = 0.7, c1W = 0.5, and c1L = 0.6.
In the left panels of Fig. 3, we show the evolution of the probabilities pA and pB as
a function of discrete time (i.e., the round of the game). In the right panels, we show the
asymmetry estimates as a function of time. Observe that, in these simulations, the animals
have identical estimates in each round. This occurs because each animal starts with the same
initial estimate and then updates its estimate at the same rate and using the same information.
In both situations in Fig. 3, the parameters give a positive expected payoff from fighting
for animal A but a negative expected payoff from fighting for animal B (i.e., δA > 0 and
δB < 0). If we were considering this scenario as a static game in which the animals had
perfect knowledge of the asymmetry size z from the start, then we would expect the outcome
to be animal A dominating animal B (as this is the ESS). Instead, however, we see that
the introduction of uncertainty in the asymmetry size allows other outcomes to occur. For
example, the bottom panel of Fig. 3 shows resource-sharing.
In the top panels of Fig. 3, one can see the development of a dominance relation. Animal
B always plays Dove after some transient number of rounds, and Animal A plays Hawk in
all 200 rounds. By contrast, resource-sharing behavior develops in the bottom panels. The
difference between the top and bottom panels is that the cost parameters are higher in the
latter. Thus, with the initial conditions held constant, a different cost for fighting can lead
to a completely different outcome. In both of the situations shown in Fig. 3, the animal
strategies reach an equilibrium and become persistent before round N = 200 of the game.
In Fig. 4, we show an example of the updating in time of the posterior-belief distribution
for an animal’s asymmetry estimate. The parameters that we use to generate this figure are
c0W = 0.2, c0L = 0.5, c1W = 0.3, c1L = 0.4, k = 0.1, and z = 0.1. Recall that the parameter z
gives the ‘true’ value of the asymmetry. Observe that the height of the posterior distribution
increases gradually as the game progresses.
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Fig. 3: Example simulations that illustrate the outcomes of (top) a dominance relation and
(bottom) resource-sharing between a pair of animals. In the left panels, we show the prob-
abilities for animals A and B to play Hawk as a function of discrete time (i.e., the round of
the game). In the right panels, we show the estimates of the size asymmetry as a function of
time.
Fig. 4: An example simulation that illustrates the updating of the posterior distribution for
an animal’s asymmetry estimate. The initial estimated prior that we use for this simulation
is centered around z = 0, and the ‘true’ value of the asymmetry is z = 0.1.
4 Discussion
In this paper, we have developed a model based on the idea that animals acquire informa-
tion from previous contests with other animals and then use this information to update their
strategy choices. For example, when the perceived value of the asymmetry between an an-
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imal and its opponent suggests that fighting would provide a negative expected payoff, one
expects (and observes in our model) that the animal’s behavior becomes less aggressive.
Our model can provide insight into why there is a reduction in aggression as the number
of interactions between animals increases over time following high initial levels of fight-
ing when animals are first placed together. Our model also illustrates that this phenomenon
can arise from animals acquiring more information about the value of asymmetries between
themselves and the other animals in their group. As the number of interactions among ani-
mals increases, they have more information to use in updating their behavior, so aggression
should go down for animals after they learn that being aggressive will cause them more
injury than gain. The key is that increased interactions can speed up the learning process.
In Fig. 5, we show that varying the value of the asymmetry size z for fixed cost parame-
ters can lead to different outcomes in our model. In the left panel, we use the parameter val-
ues c1L = 0.2, c0W = 0.1, and c1W = 0.1. In the right panel, to illustrate a situation in which
there would be more resource-sharing, we use the cost parameters c1L = 0.6, c0L = 0.9, and
c1W = 0.1. Each parameter that we use for the right panel is greater than or equal to the cor-
responding parameter that we use for the left panel. The reddish orange region corresponds
to parameter values that result in persistent Hawk-Hawk behavior. The light greenish blue
regions correspond to parameter values that result in persistent Hawk-Dove behavior (i.e.,
the dominance relation in which A dominates), and the greenish yellow regions correspond
to parameter values that result in persistent Dove-Hawk behavior (i.e., the dominance rela-
tion in which B dominates). The dark blue regions correspond to parameter values that result
in persistent Dove-Dove behavior (i.e., resource-sharing).
Fig. 5: Bifurcation diagrams illustrating the effects of the size asymmetry z on the relative
frequency of resource-sharing versus dominance relations as a function of the cost param-
eters (left) c0L and (right) c0W . The reddish orange, light greenish blue, greenish yellow,
and dark blue regions correspond, respectively, to parameter values that result in persis-
tent Hawk-Hawk, Hawk-Dove, Dove-Hawk, and Dove-Dove behaviors. (As usual, the left
strategy is played by animal A, and the right strategy is played by animal B.)
In both panels of Fig. 5, we observe that there is a window of values for the asymmetry
in which resource-sharing can occur (i.e., for which there is no dominance relation). This
window increases in size as the cost parameter on the vertical axis increases. From a biolog-
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ical perspective, this corresponds to the fact that a pair of animals with a small difference in
their RHPs become more willing to share a resource as the injury costs of fighting become
higher. Given that we have normalized the resource value in formulating our model, an in-
crease in the costs of fighting can alternatively be interpreted as a decrease in the value that
the animals attach to the resource.
4.1 Constructing a Dominance Hierarchy from a Set of Pairwise Dominance Relations
As we discussed in Section 2.2.1, a dominance relation results when a pairwise contest even-
tually leads either to a Dove-Hawk or to a Hawk-Dove outcome. Resource-sharing results
when both animals play the Dove strategy.
Suppose that there are sequences of pairwise contests among a group of animals. One
can use the eventual outcomes of these contests to construct a dominance hierarchy among
these animals. However, there can be difficulties in ranking animals in situations in which the
interactions yield dominance relations are not transitive. For example, consider the situation
in which animal A dominates animal B, animal A shares the resource with animal C, but
animal B dominates animal C. See Ref. [38] for examples of intransitive ‘triads’ occurring
in animal groups.
A dominance measure provides one method with which to rank animals as a dominance
hierarchy. The interactions between animals can also be summarized into a dominance ma-
trix, which can then be used to rank the dominance relations as a dominance hierarchy
[4, 27, 58].
It is potentially desirable to discuss an example of how a model like ours, which pro-
duces pairwise dominance relations, can be used as a tool to construct a dominance hierar-
chy. However, doing so would require us to make several further assumptions, as there are
many factors that need to be considered when trying to construct a hierarchy. What struc-
ture (if any) should one assume for the interactions between animals? For example, is it
suitable to consider a round-robin tournament? More generally, one can envision (at least
in principle) using any time-dependent network of interactions between pairs of animals.
Additionally, what dominance measure should one use?
It is important to note that different ranking methods yield different dominance hierar-
chies using the same set of dominance relations. There have been some comparative studies
that have examined the relative performance of various ranking methods (see, for example,
Ref. [4]).
Other factors also need to be considered when determining a dominance hierarchy. How
should one account for situations in which there is a draw in the dominance measure between
two or more animals? One way to eliminate draws from is by calculating so-called “power
ratings” for the animals (as is done in some systems for ranking sports teams) [34]. However,
from a biological perspective, a draw in a dominance measure might correspond to a situa-
tion in which there is no stable dominance relation between a pair of animals that achieved
a draw. Consequently, in such a situation, one animal does not rank higher or lower than the
other animal; they might well just continue fighting or fight again later. One can imagine
this occurring between a pair of animals when the size of the asymmetry between them is
small.
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4.2 Limitations of Our Model
Now that we have developed a simple but reasonable model, a natural desire is to test it
using real data. To frame our discussion of this issue, recall that the parameters in our model
are the size asymmetry z, the animal responsiveness k, and the cost parameters c0L, c1L, c0W ,
and c1W . Our model also includes a probability distribution to model animal uncertainty in
estimating z, and we can use the same modelling framework with any choice of distribution.
To test our model using empirical data, one would need to determine reasonable esti-
mates for the values for the above parameters (so that we can use them in our simulations).
In principle, one should be able to determine values for the parameter k based on research
that has been conducted into the responsiveness of many different species of animals to
environmental stimuli [60]. However, it is difficult to measure factors such as the costs of
fighting, so it is difficult to test models that contain such parameters against observational
data. It is important to note that this limitation (i.e., difficulty in estimating the values of cost
parameters using real data) is a weakness that exists throughout the field of evolutionary
game theory and is not a limitation that is peculiar to our model.
The evolution of the behavior that animals display depends on the relative sizes of costs
and benefits that are associated with adopting different behaviors. This justifies the cost
parameters, which are critical for modelling the animals’ behavior. One strategy to address
the difficulty in measuring such parameters would be to modify our model to use ‘surrogate’
cost parameters such as the duration of an escalated contest [25] or values that are calculated
by considering features such as animal heartbeat rate [49]. Additionally, some researchers
have tried to directly assess the fighting abilities of animals (see, for example, Refs. [29, 31]).
In our model, we made the assumption that the difference in RHP between each pair of
animals remains constant. Our model would need to be generalized to examine groups of
animals in which the RHPs can change. For example, the RHPs of red deer stags can change
considerably during the breeding season [13], and this results in frequent serious fighting
during the entire season. By contrast, our model is suitable for animal groups, such as flocks
of chickens, in which the animals’ body condition does not change much over time. Interac-
tions in this type of animal group result in serious fighting initially, but subsequently there is
a long period without fighting or assessment. In such animal groups, our model can provide
insight into why this phenomenon occurs — interactions form part of a learning process in
which animals acquire more information about the value of the asymmetries between them-
selves and the other animals in their group. This leads to less aggressive behavior in animals
who perceive that being aggressive would cause them more injury than gain.
4.3 Generalizations of Our Model
Despite its limitations, the model that we have introduced in this paper has several novel
features, and it provides a sound foundation upon which to build. Indeed, there are many
possible ways to generalize our model.
For example, it is straightforward to incorporate features such as the ability to allow
new animals to join a group. In such a scenario, the animals that are already in a group
usually show a high level of ‘in-group’ aggression to the new individual [15, 48]. From the
perspective of our model, such behavior occurs while the animals are acquiring information
with which to update their asymmetry estimates. Additionally, our model only considers
the possibility of one type of asymmetry between animals. One can, however, incorporate
additional asymmetries, such as in their perceived value of a resource.
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It is also possible to relax some of the assumptions that we made. For example, one could
go beyond pairwise contests and consider ‘bystander effects,’ as an animal that observes
other animals’ contests obtains information by being a spectator. Such effects have been
considered in some hierarchy models [20].
5 Conclusion
We have developed a novel model, which accounts for asymmetries between individuals, to
explain the formation of dominance relations in animals. In this model, which introduces a
connection between Hawk-Dove games and the formation of dominance hierarchies, we ex-
amine how directly incorporating the feature that animals initially have incomplete informa-
tion about their RHP relative to other animals can lead to widespread aggression, followed
by the formation of dominance relations in animal groups when there might otherwise have
been resource-sharing.
Our model incorporates the fact that it is unlikely for animals to persistently risk in-
jury in situations in which fighting would give a negative expected payoff. The sizes of the
asymmetry between animals also play a significant role in determining the outcomes of in-
teractions between members of animal groups. When an animal plays the repeated game (in
which it repeatedly fights another animal), it gains information that allows it to update its
asymmetry estimate and reduce its aggression level when fighting would cause more injury
than gain. This gathering of information from previous contests to update asymmetry esti-
mates can provide insight into biological features in several species of animals, such as the
reduced aggression (after initial periods of significant aggression) among a group of animals
when there are many repeated interactions.
Our model provides a solid foundation for a family of models that generalize our study
in various ways, and we believe that such models can yield interesting insights on dominance
hierarchies and resource-sharing in animals.
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